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Abstract 
This paper explores the historical context behind the emergence of the due process 
value system which lies at the heart of the Anglo-American legal tradition. By 
demonstrating, in particular, the reformative impact which the emergence of 
adversarial sensibilities in the late eighteenth century had in relieving the testimonial 
obligations of an accused, the paper explores the shift which occurred during this 
period towards an inculpatory model of justice. Significantly, this inculpatory model 
rejected the pro-prosecutorial bias which had epitomised the pursuit for justice in 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Moreover, whereas the antecedent 
exculpatory justice model was predicated upon the pro-active prosecutorial efforts of 
the aggrieved victim, this inculpatory programme rejected the victim’s experiential 
narrative with the State assuming exclusive responsibility for the prosecution of 
crime.  
 
With an accused therefore no longer facing the limited prosecutorial resources of the 
victim, but rather the unlimited resources of the State, an equality of arms framework 
emerged to protect his rights. Resulting in a re-configuration of courtroom relations 
and an elevation of evidential standards, this equality of arms framework prompted 
the birth of our adversarial legal dynamic and cultivated some of the most important 
due process values which lie at the heart of our modern trial process. 
 
Keywords Criminal Process, Adversarialism, Legal History, Criminal Law, Due 
Process, the Adversary Process, Criminology. 
 
Introduction: Terror, Mercy and Discretion in the Seventeenth Century 
Social order in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was maintained through the 
subtle interplay of a savage punitive code and a well-established culture of legal 
clemency. In this regard, the punitive landscape of this mercurial era was, at once, 
dominated by both the solemn institution of the gallows and a well-established 
system of concessions.1 These two interdependent elements were vital in sustaining 
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the exculpatory legal system’s legitimacy; the brutality safeguarded the authority of 
the ruling class, while clemency considerations ensured that the number of episodes 
of gross punishment never rose beyond a socially-acceptable level.  
 
The distinct sense of threat to hegemonic order which prevailed during the 
seventeenth century is perhaps most clearly evident in the political contributions of 
the essayist Timothy Nourse. For Nourse, as indeed for many of the ruling gentry of 
the epoch, the common people of England were to be regarded as ‘very rough and 
savage in their Dispositions, being of leveling Principles, and refractory to 
Government, insolent and tumultuous’.2 Driven thus by a belief in the inexorable 
depravity of the weaker social classes, the gallows became an ever-more common 
presence within a brutal society which ‘cherished the death sentence’. 3  Indeed 
nowhere is this era’s obsession with capital punishment more apparent than within 
England’s statute book at the beginning of the eighteenth century where the number 
of capital statutes grew in number from a total of 50 in 1688 to in excess of 200 by 
1820.4  
 
Acting, however, as an important counterbalance to the inevitable bloody 
consequences of this brutal punitive programme was a subtle, but unmistakeable, 
culture of legal clemency. From the individual empowerment of victims in 
sympathetically framing (or, indeed, abandoning) criminal charges to the freedom of 
the judiciary to deliver merciful pronouncements, the criminal justice system operated 
in a uniquely discretionary manner which, at every turn, emphasised clemency. 
Indeed, in the absence of a professional police force, the bonds of fidelity cultivated 
by this policy of patriarchal clemency were fundamental in commanding hegemonic 
order. To quote Hay: 
  
 discretion allowed a perpetrator to terrorize the petty thief and then 
 command his gratitude, or at least approval of his neighbourhood as a man of 
 compassion. It allowed the class that passed one of the bloodiest penal 
 codes in Europe to congratulate itself on its humanity.5 
 
 
                                                        
2
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and E.P Thompson (eds.) Albion’s Fatal Tree (Pantheon, 1975) pp.17-63, p.17. 
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1 The Exculpatory Model of Justice 
Owing to its predication upon infrequent acts of expressive punishment, the criminal 
justice framework which existed in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
was uniquely informal in its disposition. Operating in a partisan, flexible and selective 
manner, justice was, in the words of King, a ‘private and negotiable process involving 
personal confrontation rather than bureaucratic procedure’. 6  Unsurprisingly 
adversarial sensibilities were at best, primitive during this era and the prosecution 
burden in criminal affairs rested entirely on the victims of crime. Thus, once victims 
made the pro-active determination to proceed with a prosecution,  
 it was [their] energy, for the most part that carried the case through the 
 various prosecution stages. Victims, for example, engaged in the fact-finding, 
 gathered witnesses, prepared cases, presented evidence in examination in 
 chief and bore the costs involved.7  
 
Justice, in effect, was a private endeavour; not a public crusade. 
 
Moreover for those victims who had the fortitude of will and financial resources to 
sustain a formal criminal charge, they were tasked with the additional burden of 
interacting with a distinctly abrupt and erratic trial process. To quote Kilcommins and 
Vaughan, criminal trials in the seventeenth century were ‘amateur, hasty and 
relatively unstructured affairs’.8 Approached by a victim often lacking any procedural 
guidance or financial support and conducted amidst the solemn gaze of an accused’s 
petty juror peers, the trial apparatus was ‘both chaotic and intimidating’.9 Adding to 
this chaos was an unrelenting courtroom programme which dictated that trial 
proceedings progress at a remarkably fast pace. Indeed so breath-taking was the 
speed at which early modern justice was administered that Cockburn likened the trial 
process to ‘rushing…a wild elephant through a sugar plantation’.10 In spite of the fact 
that the trial ‘can rarely have taken as much as an hour’, it nevertheless enjoined 
upon an accused within this extremely narrow timeframe to skilfully navigate his way 
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through a series of burdensome and biased procedural obstacles if he wished to be 
spared from the gallows. 
 
Prosecutorial Bias 
(a) The Marian Pre-Trial Procedure 
Enshrined within the Marian Committal Statute 1555 11 , this pre-trial procedure 
mandated that a Justice of the Peace perform a rudimentary examination of a 
criminal allegation in order to determine whether pre-trial detention was merited. In 
seeking to re-enforce ties of patronage, Justices of the Peace were not formally 
trained magistrates but were members of the local gentry knowledgeable in civil and 
political affairs. Their central role was to distil from an accused a narrative of events 
and to prepare a submission for the trial court containing all matters ‘material to 
prove the felony’.12 This legislative emphasis on testimony against the accused was 
deliberate and the Marian pre-trial procedure was ostensibly tailored to assist the 
prosecution. To this end, the justices were empowered to bind over all prosecution 
witnesses (including, the victim) in recognizances and, if necessary, they could 
commit the defendant to gaol pending his formal trial. Indeed, the distinct 
prosecutorial bias underpinning this procedure is acutely apparent in Barlow’s 
pejorative instruction that Justices of the Peace ought not to ‘examine Witnesses that 
expressly come to prove the Offender’s Innocence’.13  
 
Reflecting on the biased nature of this procedure, Stuntz has remarked that the 
Marion pre-trial process resembled, in many respects, aspects of modern police 
practice in allowing information to be gathered from ‘an uncounseled, and frequently 
frightened and confused, defendant’.14 In serving to re-enforce the prosecutorial bias 
of the system, the accused often approached the pre-trial inquiry unaware of his right 
to remain silent and without the benefit of a formal caution. In this regard an accused 
often ‘impaled himself at pre-trial’ in a manner which rendered worthless any latent 
                                                        
11
 An Act Appointing an Order to Justices of Peace for the Bailment of Prisoners (1554-1555), 
1 &2 Phil. & Mar. c.13.  
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 Ibid. [emphasis added]. For a full account of the Statute see John Langbein, Prosecuting 
Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (Harvard University Press, 1974) 
p.256. 
13
 Theodore Barlow, The Justice Of Peace: A Treatise Containing The Power And Duty Of 
That Magistrate (Lintot, 1745) 190 [emphasis added]. For a more detailed account of Barlow’s 
instruction see John Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) p.43. According to Langbein it was the duty of a Justice of the 
Peace to ‘help the accuser build the prosecution case, rather than to serve as a neutral 
investigator.’    
14
 William Stuntz, ‘The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,’ Yale Law Journal 105 
(1995) 393-449, p.417. 
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defence raised at the substantive trial.15 For instance, Beattie recalls a case in 1759 
where an Old Bailey court admitted confession evidence made by a servant at a pre-
trial hearing in circumstances where she was falsely assured that she could keep the 
stolen items if she confessed her guilt.16 While admittedly, as Langbein, has shown, 
by the 1760s judicial acceptance of such confessions was becoming an ever-more 
infrequent occurrence17, this particular case, it is submitted, is emblematic of the pro-
prosecutorial bias which informed the Marian procedure for the best part of two 
centuries.18  
 
(b) The Lawyer-Free ‘Altercation’ in the Courtroom 
In stark contrast to the procedural formality of our contemporary adversarial trial, the 
early modern courtroom dynamic took the shape - to borrow the terminology of Smith 
- of an ‘altercation’ between an accused and his accuser. 19  Significantly, this 
altercation took place in the absence of counsel. Resembling, what Langbein has 
termed as a ‘lawyer-free contest of amateurs’, the courtroom spectacle of the 
seventeenth century demanded, in effect, that an accused stand as both a defendant 
and a lead witness in his own trial with the victim acting as chief prosecutor.20  
 
The parties, however, did not approach this courtroom confrontation with an equality 
of arms. Indeed that a prosecutorial bias existed within the early modern criminal 
justice framework is apparent from the contribution of Thomas Green who notes that 
the courtroom trial was:  
 
 a contest in which the accuser and the accused exchanged their stories in a 
 heated give-and-take. The accuser might be prompted by the bench, which 
                                                        
15
 John Langbein, ‘The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at 
Common Law,’ Michigan Law Review 92 (1994)1047-1058, p.1061. 
16
 Old Bailey Proceedings (January 1759, t17590117-25) as cited in John Beattie, ‘Sir John 
Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, 1754-1780’ Law and History 
Review 25(1) (2007) 61-100 at n.55. 
17
 For instance, a judge refused to accept a written confession in 1774 when John Leigh, the 
chief clerk at Bow Street magistrate’s office, acknowledged that John Fielding had told the 
accused that if he confessed “he would endeavor to save his life” as quoted in Beattie, ‘Sir 
John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, 1754-1780’, n.59. 
18
 Langbein notes that by the 1760s the bench had adopted a rule - known as the ‘confession 
rule’ - which declared that only confessions given freely and voluntarily would be allowed as 
evidence. See Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, pp.218-223. 
19
 Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, Mary Dewar (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 
1982) p.114. Originally published in 1583. See also Langbein, ‘The Historical Origins of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law,’ pp.1047-1049. 
20
 John Langbein, ‘The Prosecutorial Origins of Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century: 
The Appearance of Solicitors’ Cambridge Law Journal 58(2) (1999) 314-365, p.314. 
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 had in hand a written record of the charges he has laid before the justices, or 
 in the pretrial sessions before the assizes clerks.21  
 
In contrast to such prosecutorial support, the defence was ‘put by the accused, for 
himself and by himself. No one interceded on his behalf to influence the impression 
he made upon the jurors.’22 Thus, with the exception of misdemeanour offences, 
there was a general prohibition against the presence of defence counsel in the 
courtroom. In short, persons accused of a capital or a felony offence were expected, 
in the words of Pulton, ‘to answer it in proper person, and not by attorney or counsel 
learned’.23 Consequently, the entire structure of the pre-modern criminal framework 
was orientated around the direct delivery and reception of an accused’s testimony: 
‘all of the pressure was brought to bear on a single point: the jurors waited to hear 
the accused speak for himself.’24 
 
This denial of defence counsel - which was to last until the 1730s - was popularly 
justified on the theoretical rationale that the guilt or innocence of an accused could 
best be determined by apprehending ‘the defendant’s immediate and unrehearsed 
responses to the evidence as it was presented’. 25  Hawkins perhaps best 
encapsulated the spirit of this prohibition when he opined:  
 
 The very Speech, Gesture and Countenance, and Manner of Defense of 
 those who are Guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help to 
 disclose the Truth, which would probably not be so well discovered from the 
 Artificial Defense of others speaking for them.26  
 
In essence, it was feared that the admission of defence counsel would result in a 
suppression of the truth; or perhaps more precisely, that defence counsel ‘would be 
so covert in their speeches, and so shadow the matter with words, and so attenuate 
the proofs and evidence, that it would be hard, or long to have the truth appear’.27 
 
Moreover, there was a widely-held belief that an innocent defendant was equally as 
capable as a professional attorney in recounting matters of fact. Again this view 
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 Thomas Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal 
Trial Jury 1200-1800 (University of Chicago Press, 1988) p.135. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ferdinand Pulton, De Pace Regis et Regni (Companie of Stationers, 1609) p.193. 
24
 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, p.137. 
25
 John Beattie, ‘Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’, Law and History Review 9(2) (1991) 221-269, p.223. 
26
 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 1716-1721, (S. Sweet, 1824) vol.2, 
p.400. 
27
 Pulton, De Pace Regis et Regni, p.193. 
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found public articulation in the critical works of Hawkins who formally announced 
that: ‘Every one of Common Understanding may as properly speak to a Matter of 
Fact, as if he were the best Lawyer…’ because ‘the Simplicity and Innocence, artless 
and ingenious Behaviour of one whose conscience acquits him, ha[s] something in it 
more moving and convincing than the highest Eloquence of Persons speaking in a 
Cause not their own’.28 
 
A further, final justification often raised to support the denial of defence counsel was 
the theory that the Court would act as counsel for the accused. That an accused 
should be afforded the luxury of such eminent legal support was widely regarded as 
providing a more than adequate legal safeguard. To quote Coke, ‘it is far better for 
an accused to have a Judge’s opinion for him, than many counsellors at the Bar’.29 
Importantly this counsel assistance was strictly limited to matters of law, not fact. 
Thus, as Beattie has observed, the Court’s obligation merely encompassed a duty to 
‘protect defendants against illegal procedure, faulty indictments, and the like. It did 
not mean that judges would help the accused to formulate a defense or act as their 
advocates’.30  
 
The commitment of the early modern Court to the defendant’s cause in addressing 
questions of law should not be over-exaggerated. It should, in particular, be 
remembered that the representative function of the judiciary was in direct conflict with 
the bench’s wider role in applying the rule of law. It was thus not uncommon for a 
court to prejudice, rather than support, an accused’s case. For instance, in the trial of 
John Lilburne, the judge - in advance of hearing the defence - declared to the jury, ‘I 
hope the Jury hath seen the Evidence so plain and so fully, that it doth confirm them 
to do their duty, and find the Prisoner guilty of what is charged upon him’.31 The 
theory of the court as counsel for the defence ignored the fact that the judiciary held 
their office at the pleasure of the Crown.32 In this regard some judicial decisions may 
have been taken, not on the merits of equity, but on the application of political 
pressure. Thus as John Hawles remarked in 1689, judges of the early modern epoch 
                                                        
28
 Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, p.400. 
29
 R v Walter Thomas (1613) 2 Bulstrode 147, 80 ER 1022.  
30
 Beattie, ‘Scales of Justice Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial’, p.223. 
31
 See John Lilburne, A Complete Collection of State Trials (1554), Thomas Bayly Howell 
(ed.) (London: T.C. Hansard, 1816) at p.1269. For greater detail in respect of John Lilburne’s 
trial, see Langbein, ‘The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at 
Common Law,’ at p.1050. 
32
 See Act of Settlement (1701), 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch.2, §3. 
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‘generally…betrayed their poor Client, to please, as they apprehended, their better 
Client, the King.’33 
 
(c) Evidential Barriers for Defendants 
In compounding the prosecutorial bias which confronted defendants in seeking to 
account unaided for their innocence, the early modern criminal justice framework did 
not accommodate a presumption of innocence. As Beattie has pointed out, to the 
extent that any probative burden existed, it rested on the shoulders of the accused, 
not the accuser:  
 
 if any assumption was made in court about the prisoner himself, it was not 
 that he was innocent until the case against him was proved beyond 
 reasonable doubt, but that if he were innocent he ought to be able to 
 demonstrate it for the jury by the character and quality of his reply to the 
 prosecutor’s evidence.34  
 
Thus, in effect, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the onus was on 
an accused to engage in self-exculpation.35 According to Stephen, the duty resting 
on an accused was clear, ‘the jury expected from him a clear explanation of the case 
against him; and if he could not give it; they convicted him’.36 
 
In seeking to discharge this probative burden, defendants had to contend with a 
series of evidential hurdles. Perhaps most significantly, witnesses for the accused 
occupied a procedurally limited role in the courtroom, enjoying a jurisdiction which 
was procedurally inferior to their prosecutorial counterparts in two key respects. 
Firstly, the prosecution - through the guise of the Marian pre-trial procedure - 
benefitted from compulsory process to require the appearance of its witnesses at 
trial. By contrast, there was no comparable means of compelling the appearance of 
defence witnesses in court. In fact it would take the promulgation of the Treason Act 
in 1696 for a right of compulsory process to be afforded on an equal basis to 
                                                        
33
 Hawles, J., Remarks Upon the Tryals of Edward Fitzharris, Stephen Colledge, Count 
Coningsmark, The Lord Russel, Collonel Sidney, Henry Cornish and Charles Bateman, 
(London: Jacob Tonson, 1689) at p.22. 
34
 John Beattie, Crime and the Courts of England, 1660-1800 (Clarendon Press, 1986) p.341. 
35
 See Kilcommins and Vaughan, Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law, p.49. 
36
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1863) pp.194-195. 
Law, Crime and History (2015) 2 
9 
 
defendants in treason cases37, with such a right not formally being recognised in 
felony cases until the early eighteenth century.38  
 
The second form of privilege afforded to prosecution witnesses in the early modern 
criminal trial was that, unlike the testimony of their adversarial opponents whose 
evidence was forbidden to be sworn, prosecution evidence was received on oath 
thereby investing it with enhanced credibility. This dichotomy in the persuasive 
authority afforded to the testimony of prosecution witness over defence witnesses is 
unmistakeably apparent in Dalton’s manual for Justices of the Peace, The Countrey 
Justice, which recounts how the assizes judges,  
 
 will often hear Witnesses and Evidence which goeth to the clearing and 
 acquittal of the Prisoner, yet [the judges] will not take [it] upon oath, but do 
 leave such Testimony and Evidence to the Jury to give credit to or think 
 thereof, as they shall see and find cause. 39 
 
Once again this pro-prosecutorial bias persisted until the landmark enactment of the 
Treason Trials Act 1696 which recognised a defendant’s right to have witnesses 
testify on oath in treason trials for the first time.40 An Act of 1702 would subsequently 
extend this right to cases of felony.41 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the criminal accused enjoyed no right of compulsory 
process, nor any right to have the testimony of his witnesses sworn, those witnesses 
who did in fact present themselves in court on his behalf ostensibly enjoyed an equal 
right of audience as their prosecutorial counterparts. In other words, there was no 
absolute rule forbidding defence witnesses in the early modern trial. As Langbein has 
pointed out, there is ample evidence to suggest that by the seventeenth century, 
witnesses for the defence were ‘routinely heard’.42 For instance, the diary of Henry 
Townsend - a Worcestershire JP active in the late seventeenth century - contains 
accounts of cases in which assize judges heard witnesses for the defence: ‘The 
                                                        
37
 Treason Act 1696 §§1, 7. 
38
 1 Anne, Stat.2 (1702), c.9, §3, see further Peter Westen, ‘The Compulsory Process Clause’ 
Michigan Law Review 73(1) (1974) 71-184.  
39
 Michael Dalton, The Countrey Justice (Societie of Stationers 1618), p.412.  
40
 Treason Act 1696, §§ 1, 7. 
41
 1 Anne, Stat. 2 (1702), c.9, §3. For further discussion see John Beattie, Policing and 
Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits of Terror (Oxford University 
Press, 2001) p.319; Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, p.52. 
42
 Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, p.56. 
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Judges usually hear evidence on behalf of the prisoner, but not upon oath, yet with a 
charge to speak the truth before God as upon oath’.43 
 
While there was, thus, no explicit rule in the altercation trial which prohibited the 
testimony of defence witnesses, two important State Trials - namely the cases of 
Throckmorton44 and Udell45 suggest that the ad hoc denial of defence witnesses was 
a persistent threat to the exoneration agenda of those accused of political wrongs. In 
the former case, which concerned a charge for treason, Langbein recounts how one 
of the trial judges dismissed Throckmorton’s witness, John Fizwilliams, with the 
words: ‘Go you ways Fitzwilliams…the court had nothing to do with you; 
peradventure you would not be so ready in a good cause.’ 46  In the latter case 
meanwhile, which concerned a charge for libelling the queen, Langbein informs us 
that the trial judge invoked the Queen’s majesty in dismissing Udall’s witness: ‘the 
witness offering themselves to be heard, were answered, that because their witness 
was against the Queen’s majesty, they could not be heard.’47  
 
It has been suggested that this judicial inclination in favour of dismissing prosecution 
witnesses in State Trials is explicable by the early modern criminal trial’s 
accommodation of an extensive pre-trial investigative process which was undertaken 
by the Privy Council.48 This line of reasoning holds that the bench’s hostility towards 
the latent appearance of defence witnesses at trial stemmed effectively from a 
judicial perception that the defendant ought to have produced such witnesses at the 
Council’s pre-trial hearing where their evidence could have been more properly and 
appropriately investigated. 49  
 
A further challenge, above and beyond the procedural subjugation of defence 
witnesses, posed by this exculpatory paradigm resided in the fact that ‘most 
defendants accused of serious crime were jailed pending trial’.50 It should be borne in 
mind that confinement conditions in seventeenth century jails were appalling; a fact 
                                                        
43
 R.D. Hunt, ‘Henry Townshend’s ‘Notes of the Office of a Justice of the Peace’ 1661-3’ in 
Miscellany II (Worcestershire Historical Society, New Series, volume 5 1967) p.68 as quoted 
in Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, p.56. 
44
 R v Nicholas Throckmorton (1554) 1 State Trials 834.  
45
 R v John Udall (1590) 1 State Trials 1271.  
46
 1 State Trial at p.855. See also Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal 
Procedure, p.54. 
47
 1 State Trials at p.1281. See also Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal 
Procedure, p.54. 
48
 Ibid, p.55. 
49
 Ibid, p.55. 
50
 Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, p.1057. 
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evidenced in Cockburn’s findings that between 1558 and 1625 at least 1,291 
prisoners died in Home Circuit jails.51 The exposure of the accused population to 
such inhospitable confinement conditions often impeded them from delivering an 
effective defence at trial, as they appeared ‘dirty, underfed and surely often ill’ such 
that they could not ‘cross-examine vigorously or challenge the evidence presented 
against them’.52  
 
Finally, the hostility of the pre-trial detention procedure was compounded by the 
Court’s refusal to permit an accused to obtain a copy of the indictment against him. 
The brutality of this denial of due process rights however was not lost on the accused 
population. Indeed a stark appreciation of the prosecutorial bias can be found in the 
pleas of the accused in R v Stephen College53: ‘I have been kept a close prisoner in 
the Tower ever since I was taken: I was all along unacquainted with what was 
charged upon me’.54 
 
2 Shifting Paradigms: The Impact of the Enlightenment 
By the middle of the eighteenth century there was a growing awareness amongst the 
social governing forces that the bloody penal code was no longer effective. Although 
the preceding century had witnessed a spectacular increase in the number of capital 
offences, Hay notes that, on a pragmatic level, the actual number of capital 
executions during this period remained ‘relatively stable’. 55  In support of this 
contention we find the empirical research of Jenkins who has shown that the number 
of executions for felony offences fell from an average of one in four offences in the 
late sixteenth century to one in every ten offences during the reign of Queen Anne 
(1702-1714).56 In essence, and as Hay has perfectly encapsulated, the central failing 
of the early modern criminal justice machinery was its discretionary disposition 
which, in practical terms, had the effect of ensuring that ‘more of those sentenced to 
death were pardoned than were hanged; thieves often escaped punishment through 
                                                        
51
 J.S. Cockburn, Calendar of Assizes Records: Home Circuit Indictments Elizabeth I and 
James I: Introduction (HMSO, 1985) pp.36-39. See also Langbein, The Historical Origins of 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, p.1057. 
52
 Beattie, Crime and the Courts of England, pp.341, 350-351. 
53
 R v Stephen College (1681) 8 State Trials 549 at p.569 as quoted in p.51. 
54
 As quoted in Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, p.90. 
55
 Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,’ p.22. 
56
 Philip Jenkins, ‘From Gallows to Prison? The Execution Rate in Early Modern England,’ 
Criminal Justice History 7 (1986) 51-71, p.57. 
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the absence of a police force, the leniency of prosecutors and juries, and the 
technicalities of the law.’57 
 
Developments in Legal Epistemology 
Contributing in no small way to society’s disenfranchisement with the unpredictable 
tenets of personal justice was the timely emergence of the measured political 
contributions of the Classical School of early criminology. Encapsulated perhaps 
most famously in the early utilitarian writings of Thomas Hobbes the disciples of this 
School - which included Locke, Rousseau and Beccaria - were uniformly united by a 
normative belief in the value of securing social order through a governance 
framework predicated upon social contract epistemology. For Hobbes, credited by 
many as the apologist of social contract theory, peace in society could only truly be 
cultivated through a shared willingness amongst all persons to ‘conferre all their 
power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce 
all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will’.58 Without popular subjugation to a 
Common Power, mankind, Hobbes proclaimed, would be forever destined to remain 
in ‘that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent…to the natural 
Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe’.59 In other 
words, in the absence of a popularly supported Sovereign an anarchic social climate- 
or, ‘state of nature’60 - would prevail within which the life of man would be ‘solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short’.61   
 
Similar collectivist sentiments, albeit lacking somewhat of the dystopian vigour of 
Hobbes, were to be heard echoing throughout the liberal philosophical contributions 
of his fellow countryman, John Locke. Significantly, however, while Locke ostensibly 
supported Hobbes’ central thesis of collective social subjugation, he refused to 
endorse his predecessor’s absolutist approach. Thus, whereas under a pure 
Hobbesian formulation of the social contract, man-kind are expected to confer ‘all 
                                                        
57
 Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,’ p.23. 
58
 Richard Tuck, (ed.) Hobbes: Leviathan (Cambridge University Press 2011) p.120. 
59
 Ibid, p.117. 
60
 In Hobbesian terms the ‘state of nature’ refers to the natural condition of mankind, free from 
the governing dictates of an absolute authority. Such a state gives rise to a universal tension 
as all men, free from the bonds of authority, are naturally predisposed to savage competitive 
strife: ‘during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in 
that condition which is called Warre; and such war is of Man against every man.’ This is the 
fundamental precept of the famous Hobbesian principle of ‘bellum omnum contra omnes’. 
See Tuck, Hobbes: Leviathan. 
61
 Ibid at p.89. 
Law, Crime and History (2015) 2 
13 
 
their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men’,62, under 
Locke’s measured natural law theory, popular acquiescence to ‘Civil Government’ is 
only justified for the solemn purpose of protecting property rights; or to use Locke’s 
own terminology, for the purpose of ‘making Laws with Penalities of Death and 
consequently all less Penalties, for Regulating and Preserving Property’.63 
 
While, given the formative roles played by Hobbes and Locke in establishing social 
contract philosophy - the former offering the epistemological basis for the theory, the 
latter refining it into a more reflexive model - England might well be regarded as the 
spiritual home of social contractarianism, it was ultimately in Italy that the philosophy 
blossomed into an effective reformative tool. Specifically, the Italian architect 
responsible for transforming this liberal ideal into a workable rational framework was 
Cessare Beccaria whose contribution to the Enlightenment acted as a catalyst for the 
pan-European rise of the Leviathan State and the ensuing emergence of due 
process sensibilities.    
 
In his seminal treatise, On Crimes and Punishments,64 Beccaria proposed a social 
contract theory which was premised on an understanding that members of society 
surrender some measure of individual liberty in order to secure social peace and 
security under the protection of the sovereign. 65  Focusing, like his English 
predecessors, on issues of collective - rather than personal - interest, Beccaria’s 
theory was founded upon a belief that popular and civilised order could only be 
sustained through a rational rule of law framework exercised by the sovereign under 
whose authority free citizens unite to form a society. 66  Taking, then, Helvétius’ 
principle of ‘utility’ as its touchstone,67 Beccaria’s social contract theory suggested 
that the outstanding objective of the sovereign is to strive towards securing ‘the 
greatest happiness shared among the greater number’.68 
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In keeping with his support for the calculative proportioning of social pain and 
pleasure,69 Beccaria’s proposed that the sum of the collective welfare of those who 
sacrificed their liberty for the greater good under the social contract legitimated the 
sovereign right to punish; a right which the sovereign was expected to exercise 
properly and proportionately. In particular, Beccaria emphasised that punishment 
under the social contract could only be justifiable if it was limited to the least amount 
necessary to have a deterrent effect; the overarching purpose of the criminal law 
being ‘nothing other than to prevent the offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows 
and do deter others from doing likewise’.70 To this end, Beccaria maintained that: 
 
 punishments and the means adopted for inflicting them should, consistent 
 with proportionality, be so selected as to make the most efficacious and 
 lasting impression on the minds of men with the least torment to the body of 
 the condemned’71 
 
For Beccaria then, punishment needed to be ‘public, speedy, necessary, the 
minimum possible in the given circumstances, proportionate to the crime, and 
determined by the law’. 72  Stressing, thus the value of punitive consistency over 
sporadic brutality, Beccaria’s contribution challenged the governing mechanisms of 
theatre and mercy relied upon by the ruling elite which, in his view, amounted to little 
more than episodic rituals of ‘premeditated pomp and slow tortures’.73 If, as Beccaria 
maintained, the certainty of punishment will always ‘make a bigger impression than 
the fear of a more awful one which is united to a hope of not being punished at all’, 
then it was clear that a more efficient, structured and objective trial apparatus was 
required.74 Importantly within this new civilised regime there could be no room for the 
ad hoc expressive brutality witnessed throughout the seventeenth century which 
‘drew attention from the crime to the criminal and by constant repetition prevented 
any useful lessons from being learned by the spectators because they either 
sympathised with the condemned or became hardened to suffering’.75 
 
Given the universality of his themes and the generality of his politico-legal 
reformative programme, Beccaria’s ideas were ‘widely, and remarkably quickly, 
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incorporated into English penal theory debate’.76 Indeed, as Draper has remarked, 
the liberal precepts contained in On Crimes and Punishments were ‘eagerly adopted’ 
by the English intellectual academy ‘as a declaration of the fundamental principles 
that ought to underpin the application of the penal sanction in an ‘improved’ 
civilisation’.77 This reformative influence is, for example, acutely apparent in the work 
of William Blackstone who explicitly endorsed the Italian scholar’s work in the fourth 
and final volume of Commentaries on the Laws of England. 78  In particular, 
Blackstone supported Beccaria’s rationalised hypothesis that social order in civilised 
society can best be sustained through a system of governance which derives its 
effectiveness from its retributive inevitability, not its visible intensity:  
 
 It is the sentiment of an ingenious writer, who seems to have well studied  the 
 springs of human action, that crimes are more effectually prevented by the 
 certainty, than by the severity, of punishment. 
 
Moreover, Blackstone shared Beccaria’s impatience with the disproportionate 
brutality of the subsisting penal code and Parliament’s seeming fetishism for enacting 
capital statutes which, in arousing compassion from victims and juries, served to 
undermine the deterrent effect of the criminal law:  
 
 So dreadful a list, instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders. 
 The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to prosecute: juries, 
 through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the 
 guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence: and judges, through compassion, 
 will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal 
 mercy.79 
 
Blackstone, however, was not alone in celebrating the significance of Beccaria’s 
work and Jeremy Bentham was also quick to voice his enthusiasm for the Italian 
scholar’s philosophical contribution. Most notably, Bentham proclaimed in 1776 that 
‘when Beccaria came he was received by the Intelligent as an Angel from heaven 
would be by the faithful’.80 Given such warm praise it is hardly surprising to find that 
Bentham’s contribution to the English criminological academy owed much of its 
normative disposition to the liberal sentiments set forth in On Crimes and 
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Punishments. In particular, it would seem that Bentham was ideologically taken with 
Beccaria’s account of the principle of utility which he recast in its now celebrated 
utilitarian form of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’.81  
 
In devising 13 ‘rules or canons’ to be considered in the application of punishment, 
Bentham set forth a considered programme for proportionate punitive engagement 
which had been noticeably absent from the generalised contributions of Hobbes, 
Beccaria and Blackstone. Standing at the heart of his positivist crusade was 
Bentham’s outstanding desire to quantify the pain caused by a given criminal 
transgression in order to allow the State to respond to it proportionately in a manner 
which would best guarantee a surfeit of social happiness.82 In this regard Bentham 
shared Beccaria’s view that the outstanding objective of punishment must be to act 
as a deterrent, rather than a retributive, device. According to Bentham, punishment 
was ‘annexed by political authority to an offensive act, in one instance; in the view of 
putting a stop to the production of events similar to the obnoxious part of its natural 
consequences, in other instances’.83  
 
Unsurprisingly, given his insistence on the introduction of a calibrated calendar of 
consistent, proportionate punishment, Bentham was normatively opposed to the 
immense volume of capital offences accommodated in the English statute book in 
the late eighteenth century. By 1831, as Draper has pointed out, Bentham appeared 
to have rejected capital punishment outright when, on reflecting on the success of 
the abolition of capital punishment in Tuscany,84 he observed:  
 In Tuscany, in the whole interval between the abolition of death-punishment, 
 in that Grand Duchy…and the re-establishment of it- the average number of 
 crimes was considerably less than those after that same re-establishment…in 
 that same interval, assassinations no more than six: while, in the Roman 
 States, not much larger than Tuscany, the number, in a quarter of the year, 
 was no less than sixty.85  
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It would, however, be somewhat misleading to attribute Bentham’s opposition to the 
spectacle of the scaffold entirely to the liberal, philosophical contributions of 
Beccaria. A good deal of the credit for Bentham’s subscription to the abolitionist 
cause is arguably owed to his close acquaintanceship with Sir Samuel Romilly.86 
Another disciple of Beccarian liberalism, Romilly was an ardent opponent of the 
gallows and, following his appointment as Solicitor General under the new Whig 
government of 1806, 87  he embarked upon an intensely pro-active reformative 
campaign to secure the abolition of capital punishment. To this end Romilly would be 
responsible for the introduction of three bills to repeal the death penalty in 1810, 
along with a further two similar bills in 1811. 88  While ultimately none of these 
reformative efforts would prove successful - owing in no small part to the entrenched 
conservatism of the then serving Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough - Romilly’s 
contribution nevertheless sparked important debate in the House of Lords on the 
need for procedural reform.89 
 
Developments in Legal Practice 
The shift which took place in the normative tone of legal scholarship in the aftermath 
of the Enlightenment coincided directly with a corresponding shift in the procedural 
dynamic of the criminal legal process. Perhaps most significantly, the eighteenth 
century witnessed active governmental involvement in the administration of the 
criminal law for the first time. With George I’s controversial accession as King of 
Great Britain and Ireland in 1714 and the ensuing threat which this development 
                                                        
86
 For a greater exploration of Bentham’s friendship with Romilly see H.A. Holland, ‘Jeremy 
Bentham’, Cambridge Law Journal 10(3) (1948-1950): 8-32, p.11.  
87
 See further, Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘The University College London Bentham Club 
Presidential Address 2010: ‘In Law, Is Procedure Really That Important?’, Juridical Review 3 
(2010) 149-162. 
88
 In 1810 the proposals in question included Bills to repeal the death penalty in cases of theft 
from a shop above the value of five shillings (10 and 11 Will 3, ch. 32), theft from a dwelling 
house above the value of 40 shillings (12 Anne Stat. 1, ch. 7), and theft on board vessels on 
navigable rivers above the value of 40 shillings (24 Geo. 2, ch. 45). The latter two Bills 
succeeded in getting through the House of Commons in 1811 but were rejected in the House 
of Lords. See further Neville Crago, ‘Lord Ellenborough as Criminal Legislator’, University of 
Western Australia Law Review 12 (1975-1976) 499-517, p.508. 
89
 In this respect, Romilly’s liberal legislative endeavours were reminiscent of the anti-
establishment, counter-hegemonic sentiment of William Godwin who in 1793 passionately 
questioned, ‘“What can be more shameless than for society to make an example of those 
whom she has goaded to breach of order, instead of amending the her own institutions which, 
by straining order into tyranny, produced the mischief?” See William Godwin, An Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice, and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, (2 vols.) 
(G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1793) at p.713.   
Law, Crime and History (2015) 2 
18 
 
posed to hegemonic order,90 the governmental class became uniquely sensitive to 
domestic disturbances which threatened the stability of the regime. Thus, not only did 
George I’s ministers introduce the first penal sanctions to be financed by central 
government directly - in the shape of the Transportation Acts of 1718 and 1720 - they 
also, as Beattie explains, ‘brought public resources to bear on the administration of 
the criminal law by paying the prosecution charges in a number of felony cases, 
including fees to solicitors to prepare briefs and to barristers to argue them in court’.91  
 
Thus, in representing arguably one of the most significant structural developments to 
have occurred in the history of the Anglo-American trial, what had previously been 
viewed as a ‘roughly balanced conflict in court between two equally unprepared 
amateurs - the victim of an offence and the accused defendant - was altered…by the 
involvement of solicitors in the management of prosecutions and the more 
professional preparation of cases’.92 Ultimately this professionalization of the criminal 
process would sound the death knell for the active courtroom presence of the victim; 
signalling a shift in the normative framework of the criminal process towards a public, 
rather than private, programme of law enforcement.   
 
Unquestionably two of the largest beneficiaries of this increased governmental 
investment in the administration of the criminal law were Henry and John Fielding, 
the famous half-brothers who served as magistrates at Bow Street, Covent Garden 
from 1746-1780. While Henry Fielding’s efforts as a novelist are often celebrated for 
cultivating popular awareness of society’s civic duty to enforce the law,93 it was as a 
magistrate that he would exert his greatest influence over the practical design of 
criminal justice proceedings. Upon succeeding Sir Thomas De Veil94 at Bow Street in 
1746, Henry Fielding set about applying the generous resources afforded to him by 
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the government towards funding an autonomous body of officers who were tasked 
specifically with apprehending serious offenders and bringing them to the office for 
pre-trial examination and commitment to trial. To this end, Fielding invested Bow 
Street with a nascent professionalised investigative framework which would later see 
it rise to become the singularly dominant magistrate’s office in the metropolis.     
 
Following Henry Fielding’s death in 1754, John Fielding assumed leadership of Bow 
Street and - in building on his brother’s legacy - he injected a renewed vigour into the 
office’s movement towards achieving greater professionalization of its magisterial 
work. For instance, he extended the opening hours of, and the number of 
magistrates sitting at, Bow Street making it easier for victims to lay charges, identify 
assailants and deliver evidence.95 In addition, Fielding retained clerical staff at Bow 
Street for the purpose of gathering and storing details of criminal wrongdoing thereby 
transforming the office into an important clearinghouse for information about offences 
and offenders. Fielding was also one of the first magistrates to broadcast crime 
reports in the press which, in turn, served to raise greater popular awareness of, not 
only the high level of victimisation in English society, but also the important remedial 
work undertaken by his office.  
 
However, while each of these reforms certainly contributed to the rise of Bow Street 
as ‘the centre of policing and prosecution in the metropolis’, 96  it was Fielding’s 
establishment of a body of ‘quasi-official detective policemen’97 - the Bow Street 
Runners - which most clearly cemented the office’s reputation as the singularly 
outstanding magistrate’s office in England. Representing, in effect, a nascent species 
of the first professional police force in the English legal tradition, these ‘runners’ 
played a highly important role in realising Fielding’s ambition for a more effective 
crime control paradigm. As Beattie explains, until this point in time, ‘no magistrate 
had ever commanded the services of men who could be sent to investigate offenses, 
apprehend suspects, and in general support the efforts of victims of crime to bring 
perpetrators to be examined and prosecuted’.98 Indeed, the warm reception shown 
by the burgeoning masses of post-Enlightenment society for the professional criminal 
justice services offered by Fielding is clearly evidenced in the significant level of 
successful felony commitments which emanated from Bow Street in the late 
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eighteenth century, whereby almost half of all Middlesex felony commitments 
between 1767-1773 came from Bow Street.99 
 
3 The Inculpatory Model of Justice 
The dawn of the nineteenth century broke amidst a re-orientated criminal legal 
landscape. Within the nascent stages of the emergent inculpatory legal regime, the 
victim lost his status as a prosecutorial actor as the State ‘gradually colonised the 
ownership of the wrongfulness of criminal wrongdoing’. 100  Significantly, this 
emergence of the State as a stakeholder in the criminal process cultivated an overt 
formalisation and professionalization of the courtroom ‘altercation’ as the government 
brought public resources to bear in retaining counsel for the prosecution of offences. 
With the accused population therefore no longer facing the meagre testimonial 
resources of an aggrieved victim but rather the ‘unlimited resources of the State’,101 
an equality of arms framework emerged which was aimed at safeguarding their rights 
and offsetting the argumentative might vested in the publically-resourced victim 
prosecutor. Resulting in an expansion of exclusionary rules of evidence, the 
imposition of a formal burden of proof and the recognition of an accused’s right to 
silence, this movement addressed the ‘bad economy of power’ of the exculpatory 
model of justice which, according to Foucault, ‘vested too much…on the side of the 
prosecution…while the accused opposed it virtually unarmed’.102 
 
Due Process Developments  
(a) Private Prosecution Associations, Professional Policing and the DPP 
The emergence of a Statist prosecution apparatus in the early nineteenth century 
was precipitated by the appearance several decades earlier of private prosecution 
associations. These associations served to enforce the collective interests of various 
social groups in the eighteenth century. As Philips has observed,  
 the formation of voluntary associations offered members a relatively cheap 
 and easy way of plugging some of the worst gaps in the system of police and 
 prosecution, by providing the individual prosecutor with the organization and 
 money needed to make the system work fairly efficiently for him.103  
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Coinciding thus with the slow decline of the exculpatory model, the late eighteenth 
century witnessed a ‘rapid proliferation of extra-parochial prosecution 
associations’.104  
 
Allied to the evolution of private prosecutions was the contemporaneous birth of 
professional thief-takers and public prosecution awards. For Rawlings, the pre-trial 
emergence of such prosecution incentives served to encourage ‘professionalism and 
detachment from victims and communities’.105  These subtle developments paved the 
way for professional policing by demonstrating the greater courtroom persuasiveness 
of professional prosecutions by comparison to the uncivilised combative approach of 
the victim-prosecutor.  
 
One of the earliest tangible signifiers of a shift in popular sensibilities towards a 
Statist enforcement machinery was the birth of centralised policing. Ireland was to be 
the chosen site for this paradigm shift and a new era in law enforcement commenced 
with the introduction of the Dublin Police Act 1786. The success of this Act would 
soon convince the popular masses of Britain to introduce a similar scheme of 
professional policing. Such was the vibrancy of social support for centralised State 
security that, according to Hay and Snyder, by the nineteenth century ‘the policeman 
came to epitomize (for virtually the entire middle class) security and order’.106 Popular 
faith in the efficiency of State-driven law enforcement would ultimately culminate a 
century later with the establishment of the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in England in 1879. With the Leviathan State firmly established as the 
rightful institution for prosecutorial expression, a framework was now in place to 
support the due process exigencies of adversarialism.   
 
(b) Full Defence Counsel Representation 
An important first step towards the cultivation of our modern adversarial courtroom 
dynamic can be traced back to the landmark legislative recognition of a right to 
defence counsel for charges of treason as introduced in the aptly named Treason Act 
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1696.107 Enacted primarily in response to growing political pressure from the Whig 
population who had suffered grievously during the inequitable treason trials of the 
Stuart regime, the Act sought - for the first time - to formally redress the prosecutorial 
bias of the early modern trial dynamic.108  Not only did the Act relax the traditional 
prohibition on defence counsel but it also introduced a previously unthinkable code of 
due process provisions into English law including the right of an accused to an 
advanced copy of an indictment, the right of an accused to take legal advice on such 
an indictment and the right to sub poena defence witnesses to testify under oath at 
trial.109 Both normatively and procedurally therefore, the Act was highly important in 
terms of symbolising ‘the dawn of an adversarial system built around equality and 
due process, which could protect the individual from the almighty power of the 
state’.110 Significantly, the equitable legacy of the Act was restricted to those political 
classes who were faced with a charge of treason. While, according to Beattie, an 
argument had been made contemporaneously with the Act’s introduction to extend 
the right to defence counsel to those accused of felony, this proposition failed due 
largely a pragmatic appreciation of the fact that ‘the accused in most felony cases 
were poor’.111  
 
Notwithstanding such partisan legislative non-enthusiasm for ameliorating the 
testimonial experience of non-treason defendants, by the mid-eighteenth century 
court reports were replete with references evidencing the increased presence of 
defence counsel within all areas of the criminal law calendar as ‘the rule prohibiting 
the defendant to have counsel gave away suddenly’.112 Arising, not from any positive 
legislative determination, but from what Beattie has termed ‘a decision by the 
judges’; the increasing frequency of legal representation in the courtroom reflected a 
growing appreciation amongst the judiciary of the pro-prosecution focus of the 
‘altercation’ trial.113  
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With the accused population increasingly tasked with overcoming the vigorous 
prosecution approaches of professional thief-takers and, in some instances, State-
funded professional prosecutions, the popularity of defence counsel in all criminal 
cases grew exponentially over the course of the eighteenth century as ‘the judges 
relaxed the rubric of court as counsel in favour of counsel as counsel’. 114  For 
instance, according to Beattie’s examination of the Old Bailey Session Papers, the 
level of defensive representation rose from 6% of cases in 1755 to between 27%-
36% of all cases by the end of the century.115 In essence, and as the case of R v 
John Barrett illustrates, by the late eighteenth century an accused’s right to defence 
counsel no longer be denied: ‘Permit[ting] counsel to examine and cross-
examine…though at first a pure indulgence, yet now seems to be grown into a 
right…’.116 
 
However, in bearing testimony to the enduring importance of direct accused 
testimony to the early Victorian criminal process, the role initially occupied by 
defence counsel in the courtroom was procedurally limited. With the exception of 
treason trials, defence counsel could only comment upon matters of law, not matters 
of fact. Thus, they were restricted to the limited role of leading examinations-in-chief 
and engaging in cross-examination.117 They could not address the jury directly, nor 
could they comment on evidence or deliver an accused’s account of events.118 Each 
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of these affairs remained firmly within the jurisdiction of the accused on the basis that 
‘it was essential that the judge and the jury hear the defendants speaking for 
themselves’.119 Moreover, the admittance of counsel beyond treason trials remained 
firmly at the discretion of the courts120 and as Coke was quick to remind the accused 
population, ‘in no case’ could a defendant ‘pray counsel learned generally, but must 
show some cause’.121 
 
In building on the liberal reformative movement of the eighteenth century, the 
nineteenth century witnessed a renewed political effort to introduce a holistic legal 
representative framework into the English trial. Helmed by William Ewart and Sir 
James Mackintosh, this liberal political crusade emphasised the importance of 
observing compulsory process in the treatment of all accused persons, not merely 
those faced with misdemeanour or treason charges. In particular Mackintosh drew 
public attention to the success which the admission of full defence counsel in treason 
trials had achieved in securing a more certain culture of criminal convictions.122 The 
rejection by the new colonies of North America of the principle of limited counsel 
engagement provided a timely boost to the campaign towards full defence: ‘We have 
never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common law of England that 
when a man is on trial for his life, he should be refused counsel’.123 
 
At a time of unprecedented social pre-occupation with liberal legal epistemology - a 
time which saw the right to full counsel representation receiving constitutional 
recognition in the American Bill of Rights, 1789124 and heard cries for procedural 
                                                                                                                                                              
no.641) 857 at p.858 as quoted in Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal 
Procedure, p.171. 
119
 Beattie, ‘Scales of Justice Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial’, p.231. 
120
 The discretionary nature of this right attracted the ire of Blackstone who remarked, ‘this is 
a matter of too much importance to be left to the good pleasure of any judge, and it is worthy 
[of] the interposition of the legislature’. See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England (Isaiah Thomas 1765) p.349-350. 
121
 Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High 
Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes (M. Flesher, for W. Lee, and D. 
Pakeman, 1644), p.137.  
122
 For instance, in 1821 Mackintosh informed the House of Commons that when a right of 
counsel representation was recognised in treason trials, its ‘benefit was universally felt as a 
safeguard for the subject’. See Parliamentary Debates 4:1512-1514 at p.1513. As quoted in 
Beattie, ‘Scales of Justice Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial’ at p.252. 
123
 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut (John Byrne, 1795-
1796) at p.398 as quoted in Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Procedure, p.40. 
124
 See U.S. Constitution, Amendment 6 which provides that ‘in all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense’. 
Law, Crime and History (2015) 2 
25 
 
reform from His Majesty’s Commissioners on Criminal Law in England125 - that the 
Prisoner’s Counsel Act 1836 was introduced.126  Conceived - in the words of its 
apologist, William Ewart - for the purpose of giving ‘freedom, certainty and vigour to 
the arm of justice’,127 this Act finally recognised the right of persons accused of felony 
‘to make full Answer and Defence thereto, by Counsel learned in the law’.128 Thus all 
of a sudden the criminal conflict became the property, not of the accused and his 
accuser, but of their professional representatives who, according to Brougham, were 
focused on protecting their client’s needs ‘by all means and expedients, and at all 
hazards and costs to other persons, and among them, to himself, is his first and only 
duty’. 129  Gradually therefore the trial evolved from an ‘expressive theatre’ which 
sought the discovery of truth to an objective process which sought the determination 
of justice;130 in other words, ‘the altercation trial gave way to a radically different style 
of proceedings, the adversary criminal trial’. 131  For those accused of crime, this 
increased lawyerisation of the criminal process fundamentally re-shaped their 
experience of the adjudicative process.  
 
The stark promotion of due process epistemology which the emergence of full 
counsel representation precipitated for the accused population is perhaps most 
clearly evidenced in two distinct developments which occurred at the close of the 
eighteenth century, namely: (1) a re-configuration of courtroom relations, and (2) an 
expansion of evidential standards. 
 
(1) The Impact of Lawyerisation: The Re-configuration of Courtroom Relations 
Unlike the informal, chaotic procedure by which claims were presented in the early 
modern trial, parties to a criminal dispute were now expected to present their cases 
in their totality before undergoing a rigorous process of cross-examination. At the 
heart of this shift in the prevailing courtroom protocol stood an overarching desire to 
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test the prosecution case. Thus, if as Beattie has argued, the early modern criminal 
framework was centred on an unarmed defendant who ‘rarely challenged [the 
victim’s evidence] systematically’, the modern trial by contrast was dominated by a 
professional advocate who demanded evidential certainty.132   
 
With the evolution of a more invasive cross-examination procedure came ‘a more 
sceptical habit of mind toward the prosecution side’.133 No longer concerned with 
simply rebutting the allegations of a victim on a piecemeal basis, an accused and his 
counsel now vehemently challenged identification evidence, suggested motives and 
witness accounts with the underlying aim of ‘casting doubt on the validity of the 
factual case being presented by the defendant’.134 Indeed no-one epitomised the 
changing ethos of defensive engagement more clearly than William Garrow who, 
according to Langbein, ‘became renowned for his intimidating cross-examinations, 
his success at avoiding the limits of full defence and his creativity in devising 
evidentiary and other legal objections’.135 For Landsman, the aggressive defensive 
strategies adopted by advocates such as Garrow at the end of the eighteenth century 
represented ‘the clearest demonstration that adversarial attitudes and methods had 
come to dominate the courtroom’.136 
 
Buoyed by the support of pro-active professional counsel, the defendant for the first 
time became, in the words of Freidman, a ‘courtroom player at his own trial’.137 
Recognised - following the introduction of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 - as having 
a right to testify under oath,138 permitted to present a full case at trial and supported 
by counsel in conducting cross-examination, the accused population benefitted 
enormously from the re-configured, due process landscape of the adversarial 
courtroom.  
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(2) The Impact of Lawyerisation: The Expansion of Evidential Standards 
Beyond altering the traditional dynamic of the courtroom, the increased presence of 
lawyers encouraged a striking elevation in evidential standards as defence counsel 
increasingly ‘sought to limit the case their clients would have to answer’.139 Thus, 
within a lawyer-dominated legal environment pre-occupied with the emerging logic of 
adversarialism, the burden of proof shifted onto the crime victim or the prosecutor as 
a presumption of innocence emerged as a cardinal principle within Anglo-American 
legal culture.140 This spirit of adversarialism dictated that the prosecution reach a 
more exacting standard of evidential certainty in delivering its case. Championing the 
rights of an accused and the exigencies of adversarial justice, our modern ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard thus emerged as a constituent element of the inculpatory 
courtroom dynamic. 141 The standard for considered due process justice was now in 
place; a standard which- in contrast to the prosecutorial bias of the exculpatory 
model- proudly proclaimed that ‘the truth of the crime will be accepted only when it is 
completely proven.’142 
 
Allied to the recognition of this exacting prosecutorial burden was an unprecedented 
growth in the corpus of exclusionary rules of evidence as victim allegations came 
under increasing scrutiny. Encompassing, inter alia, the introduction of corroboration 
warnings for accomplice testimony, a recognition of the inadmissibility of hearsay 
evidence, greater scrutiny of the voluntariness of confessions and a rejection of bard 
character evidence, these rules, in effect, provided the evidential foundation for our 
modern adversarial process.143 
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Conclusion 
The courtroom dynamic which confronted a criminal accused in the early nineteenth 
century bore little resemblance to the chaotic, unpredictable arena which had 
dominated the criminal adjudicative process two centuries earlier. Tasked with the 
responsibility for commanding social order within an increasingly urbanised and 
emerging capitalist economy, the trial apparatus could no longer sustain the informal 
character-based considerations which had epitomised its search for truth under the 
exculpatory regime of the seventeenth century. Within this new liberal climate there 
was no room for the pro-prosecutorial bias which had defined the early modern 
pursuit for justice. Buoyed by the timely, tempered and rationalised contribution of 
the Enlightenment academy, the State emerged as the central institution for punitive 
engagement as ‘an economy of continuity and permanence…replace[d] that of 
expenditure and excess’.144 
 
With the dawn of the State-prosecution era came the dawn of adversarialism and the 
birth of due process rights. Helmed by the combative figure of the professional 
advocate, this emerging adversarial movement was a vital component in a broader 
equality of arms framework which sought to protect an accused from the unlimited 
prosecutorial resources of the State. Thus it was during this formative, post-
Enlightenment era that our now entrenched culture of counsel-led cross-examination 
first emerged relegating the victim, the judiciary and the jury to the role of spectators 
in the evidence-adducing process. In contrast to the amorphous legal code of 
seventeenth century society, there now stood an expanding corpus of exacting 
evidential standards. Encompassing, inter alia, a shift in the burden of proof, an 
articulation of the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, a recognition of the 
presumption of innocence and an expansion of exclusionary rules of evidence, the 
eighteenth century movement for reform effectively established many of the 
probative assumptions and due process values which continue to underpin our 
modern adversarial trial dynamic. 
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